THE INVESTIGATIVE FUNCTIONS OF NIGERIAN LEGISLATURES: THE COMPLICITIES AND COMPROMISES

Abstract

This paper critically examines the investigative functions of Nigerian legislatures within their constitutional mandate and practical operation. Although Sections 88–89 and 128–129 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) empower legislatures to conduct inquiries, summon witnesses, and expose corruption, the exercise of these powers has been persistently undermined by political interference, institutional weaknesses, and ethical compromises. Drawing on legal, political, institutional, and philosophical perspectives, the study argues that legislative investigations in Nigeria often function as ritualistic performances rather than substantive accountability mechanisms. Empirically, high-profile probes have revealed patterns of bribery, selective targeting, executive capture, and non-implementation of investigative reports. Philosophically, the paper interrogates the moral contradiction inherent in lawmakers acting as lawbreakers, employing virtue ethics, social contract theory, and African communitarian philosophy to expose the ethical collapse that corrodes democratic legitimacy. The paper concludes that revitalizing legislative investigations requires institutional reforms, professionalization of committees, enforcement of investigative outcomes, ethical reorientation of lawmakers, and sustained civic engagement. Without these measures, legislative oversight will remain compromised, further eroding public trust and democratic governance in Nigeria.